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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
OGDEN CITY, A Municipal Corpora-
tion, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, a body politic and UTAH 
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
7907 
DEFENDANT PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 14, 1951, the City Commission of Ogden 
City enacted an ordinance granting to Utah Power and 
Light Co. (Defendent herein) "* * * the right, privil-
ege or franchise * ~~< *" (R. 250) to operate an electric 
utility business in Ogden City. This same ordinance levied 
a charge upon the defendant company equal to 2% of its 
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gross revenue derived from doing business within the 
corporate limits of the city. 
Prior to the enacting of this ordinance, the defendant 
company paid to Ogden City a sum equal to % of 1% of 
the company's gross revenue derived from operating within 
the city limits plus certain free and reduced rate service 
(R. 251-2). 
All of the parties hereto have characterized this levy 
as either a "license tax" or "franchise tax." 
As pointed out in the plaintiff's brief, the P. S. C. U. 
in its case No. 3780 after a hearing upon defendant com-
pany's application for a rate increase, heard in May and 
June, 1952, ordered the company to collect this 2% levy 
from "its customers in any municipality wherein is im-
posed any municipal franchise, occupation, sales or license 
tax." 
There is no substantial question of fact in this case. 
This case is not concerned with the imposition of municipal 
levies nor with the obligation or duty of the company to 
discharge such levies. This case is directly and necessarily 
concerned with the matter of the source of certain company 
revenue, and the order of the commission here under re-
vie~ undertakes to provide and prescribe the sources of 
company revenue to pay the levy of Ogden City, and other 
municipalities similarly enacting franchise or license taxes. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS WITH-
IN THE COMMISSION'S JURISDICTION, POW-
ER AND AUTHORITY. 
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POINT II. 
THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE MA-
TERIAL FINDINGS OF SEC. 9, OF THE COM-
MISSION'S REPORT AND FINDINGS OF 
FACT. 
POINT III. 
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION DOES 
NOT IMPAIR THE OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED 
BY OGDEN CITY'S FRANCHISE ORDINANCE. 
POINT IV. 
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION DOES 
NOT ATTEMPT TO EXERCISE SUPER-
VISORY POWER OVER, NOR INTERFERE 
WITH MUNICIPAL MONEY AND PROPERTY. 
POINT V. 
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION DOES 
NOT UNLAWFULLY ATTEMPT TO EXERCISE 
POWER TO SUPERVISE AND INTERFERE 
WITH MUNICIPAL MONEY AND PROPERTY; 
NOR DOES IT CONSTITUTE AN EXERCISE 
OF THE TAXING POWER. 
ARGUMENT 
There is apparently only one issue in this case and 
that is whether or not just and reasonable practices require 
that the company construct its rates so that, so far as 
practicable, money to discharge municipal levies shall be 
collected from its customers on a state-wide system basis. 
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POINT I. 
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS WITH-
IN THE COMMISSION'S JURISDICTION, POW-
ER AND AUTHORITY. 
Since. this same contention has been raised by Ogden 
City in a similar case involving an order of the commission 
to the same effect as the order herein attacked and an 
appeal to this court (In re The Mountain States Tel. & Tel. 
Co., I. & S. Docket No. 83, May 5, 1952, appeal case No. 
7884) wherein the problem was thoroughly aired and 
authorities cited; it is believed unnecessary to duplicate 
the full review of authorities cited therein. 
However, Section 54-4-1, and Section 54-4-4, U. C. A. 
1953, gives the commission general jurisdiction over this 
subject. Also, in the case of Mountain States Tel. & Tel. 
Co. v. Public Service Commission, et al., 155 P. (2d) 184, 
107 U. 502 (1945) the court said: 
"The determination that rates charged are un-
just, unreasonable, or confiscatory is not a judicial 
function, but a legislative function to be exercised by 
Public Service Commission as an arm of the legisla-
ture." 
Certainly it cannot be successfully contended that the 
statutes governing the Public Service Commission do not 
plainly bring within its jurisdiction the type of problem 
sought to be solved by the commission's order herein at-
tacked. 
The commission is under a statutory duty (Sec. 54-3-1, 
U. C. A. 1953) to see that all charges made by a public 
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utility "shall be just and reasonable"; and that is ex-
actly what the commission has sought to do in its order. 
It is to be noted that the so-called franchise ordinance 
of Ogden City does not attempt to specify where the money 
should come from with which the company is to pay the 
sums required by its terms. It merely says that the com-
pany shall pay it. The company gets its money by estab-
lishing rates to be paid by its customers and the rates to 
be charged by the company are under the control and within 
the jurisdiction of the commission. 
It must be concluded that the order of the commission 
is within its jurisdiction, power and authority. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE MA-
TERIAL FINDINGS OF SEC. 9, OF THE COM-
MISSION'S REPORT AND FINDINGS OF 
FACT. 
Under this point it would seem advisable to point up 
the well known distinction between evidentiary facts and 
ultimate facts. An ultimate fact is in the nature of a con-
clusion based upon other facts which are called evidentiary 
or primary facts. In this case we find the primary or evi-
dentiary facts to be that the plaintiff (plus some 26 other 
municipalities) have imposed franchise taxes upon the de-
fendant company measured by the gross receipts of the 
company from business within the municipality. The money 
to pay for this levy is contributed by the company's custom-
ers in unincorporated areas and in municipalities which 
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do not have such a tax, and, I suppose in municipalities 
which have a similar tax to the extent that plaintiff's levy 
exceeds the levy of that municipality. From these primary 
or evidentiary facts are to be drawn the ultimate fact or 
facts. 
In this case the commission has drawn from the evi-
dentiary facts set forth above the conclusion or ultimate 
fact that the practice of the company in collecting this 
franchise tax from all users systemwide is an unreasonable 
and unjust rate practice by the company. 
Under Section 54-3-8, U. C. A. 1953, the commission 
is given the "power to determine any question of fact aris-
ing under this section," namely, when is there an unjust and 
unreasonable discrimination between rate payers in dif-
ferent localfties? 
The views of the Supreme Court of Washington in the 
case of State v. Department of Public Service, 142 P (2d) 
489, at page 535, refers to this same problem and uses the 
following language: 
"as stated above, the basis upon which excise taxes 
have been levied by the cities vary greatly, ranging 
from four per cent of the gross income to one per 
cent. No one can say how far this variation might 
be extended. It suggests large possibilities of muni-
cipal action. Manifestly there is an element of un-
just discrimination in allowing one community to 
levy and collect from respondent or any public util-
ity engaged in business throughout the state an 
occupation tax which in turn the utility would col-
lect by a state-wide increase in rates." 
In addition it should be kept in mind that prior to the 
enactment of this franchise tax by Ogden City the company 
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paid 3,4 of 1% ; then by the enactment of this ordinance the 
payment was increased to 2% of the gross receipts. It does 
not appear that this increased rate coincided with any in-
creased use or privilege to the company. The company 
merely continues to enjoy the rights and privileges which 
it has for many, many years. Nor can the extension of 
time satisfy the concept of consideration because certainly 
Ogden City did not plan to do without an electric utility, 
and it is supposed that should Ogden City desire to go into 
the electric business it can still do so in spite of the fran-
chise ordinance. 
The conclusion must be made that the Ogden City 
Ordinance is plainly a revenue raising tax from which it 
may be properly concluded that it is manifestly "unjust and 
unreasonable" to spread the cost of this tax system wide. 
POINT III. 
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION DOES 
NOT IMPAIR THE OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED 
BY OGDEN CITY'S FRANCHISE ORDINANCE. 
It is to be observed at the outset that the ordinance of 
Ogden City does not attempt to specify any particular. 
source of the money to pay the charge levied upon the com-
pany. The ordinance does not require the company not 
to impose this franchise tax upon the Company's custo-
mers in Ogden City. 
It would almost appear that Ogden City believed that 
the company has an independent source of income separ-
ate and apart from the users of the electric utility. It would 
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also appear that Ogden City is claiming a constitutional 
right to tax residents of other municipalities, in that it 
claims that its own citizens should be free from the tax 
levied upon the company. 
However, as poi~ted out in the telephone case, we are 
.concerned in this case with the one issue, namely, what shall 
be the source of the revenue to the company by which this 
franchise tax shall be paid? It is considered useless to en-
gage ourselves in the circular argument that the citizens 
of Ogden are the real parties in interest and therefore are 
being deprived of the benefit of their "contract"; because 
the users of the utility are, by the same reasoning, the real 
parties in interest on the other side, and therefore many 
of the same people are both the obligors and obligees to this 
"contract". Thus we arrive at a patently untenable posi-
tion because you cannot be both free and bound at the 
same time. 
Thus for the sake of sensibility we must return to the 
analysis that all we are concerned with here is the problem 
of public utility rates and revenue. 
Reference should be made to point III, in the Brief 
of Defendant, case No. 7884 which is now before this court 
where this question as raised by plaintiff is thoroughly 
discussed; and inasmuch as this case is in principle a com-
panion case to that one it is persuasive authority on this 
question. 
When the alleged "contract" does not specify the source 
of the money with which the company is to pay the levy, how 
can it possibly be said that the order of the Commission 
impairs the obligations of that franchise? -
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POINT IV. 
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION DOES 
NOT ATTEMPT TO EXERCISE SUPER-
VISORY POWER OVER, NOR INTERFERE 
WITH MUNICIPAL MONEY AND PROPERTY. 
Before the order in question was issued, the Company 
was obligated to pay the City certain. taxes and to render 
certain services. This duty remains completely unimpaired; 
the City will receive precisely the same money and service, 
at the same time, at the same rate, and from the same tax-
payer as before. The Commission has the undisputed power 
to regulate and control the rate relationship between the 
Company and its customers whether these customers live ' 
in Ogden City or elsewhere. The Commission's order af-
fects only the relationship between the Company and its 
customers, and nothing more. 
POINT V. 
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION DOES 
NOT UNLAWFULLY ATTEMPT TO EXERCISE 
POWER TO SUPERVISE AND INTERFERE 
WITH MUNICIPAL MONEY AND PROP:h:RTY; 
NOR DOES IT CONSTITUTE AN EXERCISE 
OF THE TAXING POWER. 
Plaintiff's Point VI, VII and VIII will be discussed 
under this Point. 
Again at the outset it must be pointed out that the 
franchise ordinance does not attempt to prescribe the 
source of the money to pay the 2% levy. Neither does the 
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order of the Commission herein name Ogden City as a 
party to whom this order has been issued. How can it be 
said that the Commission has attempted to interfere with 
the municipal money and property when the only order 
issued by the Commission is directed to the Utah Power and 
Light Company which clearly comes within the scope of 
the Commission's regulatory power and authority? 
Again it must be observed that Ogden City supposes 
that the Company has some source of income other than its 
customers. Any rate order of the commission is for the 
purpose of transferring the obligations of the Company to 
its customers because to do otherwise would expose the 
Company to an unconstitutional confiscation of its property. 
The city of Ogden is in the odd position of claiming the 
power (and right) to levy a tax which, of necessity, the 
major part of which is to be paid by persons outside of its 
territorial jurisdiction. It would appear that we have here 
a thinly veiled purpose, on the part of Ogden City, to ex-
tend the source of its tax revenues to include those living 
in the rest of the State. 
If weight is to be given to Ogden City's argument under 
Point VI of its brief, then it would be necessary to hold that 
none of the money to pay this 2% levy could, under our 
constitution, be apportioned to residents of Ogden City, 
but would have to be obtained from electric users outside 
of Ogden City. To announce the proposition is to confirm 
its absurdity. 
It would appear that when plaintiff cites and quotes 
from State vs. Dept. of Public Service, 142 P. 498, 535, in 
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its points VII and VIII, a sufficient answer is given to the 
arguments advanced by Ogden City thereunder. Does it 
make a serious difference, if indeed the Commission's order 
creates a difference, whether the levy of the city is passed 
on to the Company's customers as a separate item or as 
"special exchange rates * * * which will in effect re-
quire the rate payers in each community to absorb a sum 
equal to the amount of the tax?" In this phase of the prob-
lem it would appear that we are faced with a distinction 
without a difference. Certainly it does not change the sub-
stantive effect of "passing on" the levy by merely chang-
ing the method of billing. What Ogden City really means is 
that its residents should not be required to pay this 2% 
levy no matter what it is called. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues raised in this case are substantially the same 
as, and will be controlled by the decision of the court in, 
case No. 7884 now being considered by this court, and the 
court's attention is drawn to that case. 
Our conclusion is the same as our beginning, namely, 
that this case is directly and necessarily concerned with 
the source of certain company revenue with which to pay 
municipal levies in the nature of franchise or license taxes. 
It is necessarily concluded that "just and reasonable" prac-
tices do not require that these revenues come from a system 
wide source, and it was proper for the commission to con-
clude that the practice of so obtaining these revenues con-
stitutes an "unjust and unreasonable" discrimination in 
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rates as against those living outside of the taxing muni-
cipalities. 
Therefore the order of the commission is reasonable 
and valid and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
PETER M. LOWE, 
Deputy Attorney General. 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
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